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Abstract
The topos approach to the formulation of physical theories includes a new form of quantum logic. We
present this topos quantum logic, including some new results, and compare it to standard quantum logic,
all with an eye to conceptual issues. In particular, we show that topos quantum logic is distributive,
multi-valued, contextual and intuitionistic. It incorporates superposition without being based on linear
structures, has a built-in form of coarse-graining which automatically avoids interpretational problems
usually associated with the conjunction of propositions about incompatible physical quantities, and provides
a material implication that is lacking from standard quantum logic. Importantly, topos quantum logic comes
with a clear geometrical underpinning. The representation of pure states and truth-value assignments are
discussed. It is brieﬂy shown how mixed states ﬁt into this approach.
Keywords: Topos approach, quantum logic, superposition, implication
1 Introduction
At a very basic level, physics is about propositions of the form “the physical quantity
A (of some given system S) has a value in the set Δ of real numbers”, written shortly
as “AεΔ”. One wants to know what truth-values such propositions have in a given
state of the system. It is also of interest how the truth-value changes with the state
(in time).
In classical physics, this is unproblematic: there is a space of states, and in any
given (pure) state
(a) all physical quantities have a value,
(b) all propositions of the form “AεΔ” have a truth-value.
For a classical system, propositions are represented by subsets of the state space.
Usually, one restricts attention to Borel subsets, and we will follow this convention
here. A (pure) state of a classical system is a point of the state space of the
system, 2 and the truth-values of propositions are true, false. The Borel subsets of
1 Email: andreas.doering@comlab.ox.ac.uk
2 We avoid the notion ‘phase space’, which seems to be a historical misnomer.
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the state space form a Boolean σ-algebra, and the logic of classical physical systems
is Boolean logic. Classical physics is a realist theory fulﬁlling properties (a) and
(b).
As is well-known, there is no such realist formulation of quantum theory: the
Kochen-Specker theorem [29,9] shows that there is no state space of a quantum
system analogous to the classical state space. Hilbert space does not play this
role. In particular, Kochen and Specker required that the physical quantities are
represented as real-valued functions on the (hypothetical) state space of a quantum
system and then showed that such a space does not exist. In fact, they showed the
even stronger result that under very natural conditions it is impossible to assign
values to all physical quantities at once, and hence it is also impossible to assign
true resp. false to all propositions.
In standard quantum logic, which goes back to the seminal paper [5] by Birkhoﬀ
and von Neumann, propositions like “AεΔ” are represented by projection operators
on Hilbert space (via the spectral theorem). The projections form a non-distributive
lattice, which makes the interpretation of the lattice operations as logical opera-
tions very dubious. Quantum logic is lacking a proper semantics. Pure states are
represented by unit vectors in Hilbert space. Let Eˆ[AεΔ] denote the projection
representing the proposition “AεΔ”. In a given state |ψ〉, we can calculate the
probability of “AεΔ” being true in the state |ψ〉:
P (AεΔ; |ψ〉) := 〈ψ| Eˆ[AεΔ] |ψ〉 ∈ [0, 1]. (1)
The interpretation is instrumentalist : upon measurement of the physical quantity
A, we will ﬁnd the result to lie in Δ with probability P (AεΔ; |ψ〉).
Standard quantum logic and its many generalisations [8] have a number of con-
ceptual and interpretational problems. To us, non-distributivity and the fundamen-
tal dependence on instrumentalist notions seem the most severe. In the following,
a proposal for a new form of quantum logic is sketched which overcomes these
problems. This new form of quantum logic arose from the topos approach to the
formulation of physical theories, initiated more than a decade ago by Butterﬁeld
and Isham [23,24,25,26]. Further references are given below.
In Section 2, the basic structures of the topos approach are introduced. In
Section 3, the representation of propositions and daseinisation of projections are
discussed. Section 4 is concerned with pure states and how they serve to assign
topos-internal truth-values to all propositions. Sections 3 and 4 are developing joint
work with Chris Isham. A number of new small results is proved. In particular, it is
shown that topos quantum logic ‘preserves’ superposition. There is some emphasis
on the conceptual discussion of the topos scheme. Section 5 sketches how mixed
states can be treated in the topos approach and how this relates to the logical
aspects. In Section 6, some related work is pointed out. Section 7 concludes.
2 The basic structures
In this section, some of the basic structures of the topos approach to quantum
theory are introduced. We can only give a sketch and some intuitive ideas here,
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for a comprehensive presentation including many further aspects and results see
[14,15,16,17] and [18]. A short introduction to the topos approach in general is
given in [10], and more recently in [13,22].
We assume that a quantum system is described by its algebra of observables.
For simplicity, we assume that this algebra is B(H), the algebra of all bounded
operators on a separable Hilbert space H of dimension 2 or greater. The Hilbert
space can be inﬁnite-dimensional. To each physical quantity A of the quantum
system, there corresponds a self-adjoint operator Aˆ in B(H) and vice versa. B(H)
is a von Neumann algebra.
We emphasise that all our results generalise without extra eﬀort to arbitrary
von Neumann algebras. 3
2.1 The context category
One central idea in the topos approach is to take contextuality into account, as
suggested by the Kochen-Specker theorem. For us, a context is an abelian subal-
gebra of the non-abelian von Neumann algebra B(H). We consider only abelian
von Neumann subalgebras, since we want enough projections in each algebra for
the spectral theorem to hold. Moreover, we consider only those abelian subalge-
bras that contain the identity operator 1ˆ on H. Let V(H) denote the set of unital,
abelian von Neumann subalgebras of B(H). V(H) is a partially ordered set under
the inclusion of smaller into larger algebras. If V ′, V ∈ V(H) are contexts such that
V ′ is contained in V , we denote the inclusion as iV ′V : V ′ → V . Since every poset
is a category, we call V(H) the context category. Its objects are the abelian von
Neumann subalgebras of B(H), and its arrows are the inclusions between them.
Every context V ∈ V(H) provides a classical perspective on the quantum system,
since, as in classical physics, all the physical quantities resp. the corresponding self-
adjoint operators in a context commute. Of course, the perspective provided by a
single context V is partial, since the quantum system has non-commuting physical
quantities that cannot all be contained in the context. But by taking all contexts
into account at once, and by moreover keeping track of their relations, one can hope
to gain a complete picture of the quantum system.
2.2 The topos associated to a quantum system and its internal logic
Of course, it will not be enough to consider the context category V(H) alone. In-
stead, one deﬁnes structures over V(H) and relations between these structures.
Concretely, one considers Set-valued functors on the context category V(H) and
natural transformations between them. 4 At this point, a choice between covariant
and contravariant functors must be made.
Let V, V ′ ∈ V(H) such that V ′ ⊂ V . The step from the algebra V to the smaller
algebra V ′ is a process of coarse-graining : since V ′ contains less self-adjoint opera-
3 It is no problem that physical quantities like position and momentum are described by unbounded op-
erators, while a von Neumann algebra contains only bounded operators. An unbounded operator can be
aﬃliated to a von Neumann algebra provided all its spectral projections lie in the algebra (see e.g. [28]).
4 The standard reference on category theory is [30].
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tors and less projections than V , one can describe less physics from the perspective
of V ′ than from V . Mapping self-adjoint operators and projections from V to V ′
hence will make it necessary to approximate. If we consider a proposition “AεΔ”
about a physical quantity A that is represented by a self-adjoint operator Aˆ in V ,
then there exists a projection Pˆ = Eˆ[AεΔ] in V that represents the proposition. It
may happen that the smaller abelian subalgebra V ′ does not contain the projection
Pˆ . This means that the proposition “AεΔ” cannot be stated from the perspective
of V ′. Both the projection Pˆ and the corresponding proposition “AεΔ” must be
adapted to V ′ by making them coarser. This leads to the idea of daseinisation,
which is discussed in detail in the following section.
On the other hand, the step from V ′ to V is trivial, since every self-adjoint
operator and every projection in V ′ is of course also contained in V . Going in this
direction, one can merely embed the smaller algebra V ′ into the larger one, without
making use of the extra structure (more self-adjoint operators, more projections,
hence more propositions) available in V .
This strongly suggests to use contravariant functors on the context category
V(H): the arrows in V(H) are the inclusions of smaller contexts V ′ into larger ones
like V , so if we want to incorporate coarse-graining, our functors over V(H) must
invert the direction of the arrows. The idea hence is to consider SetV(H)
op
, the
collection of Set-valued contravariant functors—traditionally called presheaves—
over the base category V(H). With natural transformations as arrows between the
presheaves, SetV(H)
op
becomes a category. This category has all the extra structure
that makes it into a topos. 5 Topos theory is a highly developed branch of pure
mathematics, and we refer to the literature for more information [20,31,27]. For
us, the important aspect is that a topos is a category whose objects ‘behave like
sets’. Each presheaf P ∈ SetV(H)op can be seen as kind of a generalised set, and
each natural transformation τ : P1 → P2 between presheaves is the analogue of
a function between sets. Presheaves can have extra structure so as to become
a group, a topological space, a ring etc. internally in the topos SetV(H)
op
(and
natural transformations may or may not preserve this extra structure).
The context category V(H) is the base category of the topos SetV(H)op , and the
contexts V ∈ V(H) are also called stages. Each presheaf P ∈ SetV(H)op can be seen
as a collection (PV )V ∈V(H) of sets, one for each context, together with functions
P(iV ′V ) : PV → PV ′ whenever V ′ ⊂ V . (If V ′ = V , then the function P(iV V ) is
the identity on PV .)
The subobject classiﬁer Ω in a topos is the object that generalises the set {0, 1}
of truth-values (where 0 is identiﬁed with false and 1 with true) in the topos Set of
sets and functions. In the topos SetV(H)
op
, the subobject classiﬁer Ω is the presheaf
of sieves on V(H). To each V ∈ V(H), the set ΩV of all sieves on V is assigned.
A sieve σ on V is a collection of subalgebras of V that is downwards closed, i.e., if
V ′ ∈ σ and V ′′ ⊂ V ′, then V ′′ ∈ σ. The maximal sieve on V is just the downset
↓V of V in V(H). If V ′ ⊂ V , then the function Ω(iV ′V ) : ΩV → ΩV ′ sends a sieve
σ ∈ ΩV to the sieve σ∩ ↓V ′ ∈ ΩV ′ .
5 I.e., it has ﬁnite limits and colimits, exponentials as well as a subobject classiﬁer.
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A truth-value in the internal logic of the topos SetV(H)
op
is a global element
γ = (γV )V ∈V(H) of the subobject classiﬁer Ω, i.e., we have γV ∈ ΩV for all V ∈ V(H)
and γV ∩ ↓V ′ = γV ′ whenever V ′ ⊂ V .
The intuitive interpretation of such a truth-value γ simply is that for each context
V ∈ V(H), we have a local truth-value true or false: if V ∈ γV˜ for some V˜ ⊇ V ,
then at V , we have true, else we have false. The fact that γ is a global element
guarantees that this is independent of the choice of V˜ . Moreover, the fact that we
have sieves means that if at some V ∈ V(H) we have true, then we have true at all
V ′ ⊂ V .
Physically, we interpret the contexts V ∈ V(H) as classical perspectives on
the quantum system under consideration. A truth-value γ hence is contextual: it
provides information about truth or falsity from each perspective V . Clearly, there
is a truth-value γ1 consisting of the maximal sieve ↓V for each context. This is
interpreted as totally true, i.e., true from all perspectives V ∈ V(H). The truth-value
γ0 consisting of the empty sieve for each V is interpreted as totally false. There are
many other truth-values between γ0 and γ1. The truth-values are partially ordered
under inclusion. It is well-known that they form a Heyting algebra, the algebraic
representative of intuitionistic propositional logic. In particular, this means that
conjunction and disjunction behave distributively. The main diﬀerence between an
intuitionistic and a Boolean logical calculus is that the law of excluded middle need
not hold in the former. If H is a Heyting algebra with top element 1, and a ∈ H
with ¬a its negation, then
a ∨ ¬a ≤ 1. (2)
In a Boolean algebra, equality holds.
The internal logic provided by the topos SetV(H)
op
hence is distributive, multi-
valued, contextual and intuitionistic. We will apply this logical structure to quan-
tum theory.
2.3 The spectral presheaf
The fact that we are using Boolean logic in classical physics is closely tied to the
fact that classical physics is based upon the idea of a state space S. A proposition
“AεΔ” about a physical quantity A of the system is represented by a subset S of
the state space. This subset contains all states (i.e., elements of the state space)
in which the proposition is true. Usually, one does not consider all subsets of state
space, but restricts attention to measurable ones. The Borel subsets B(S) form a
σ-complete Boolean algebra.
In classical physics, in any given state s ∈ S, every proposition has a truth-value.
If s lies in the subset of S representing the proposition, then the proposition is true,
otherwise it is false.
The Kochen-Specker theorem [29] shows that there is no analogous state space
picture for quantum theory. The theorem is often interpreted as meaning that
there are no non-contextual truth-value assignments in quantum theory. The topos
approach takes this as a motivation and starting point. For each context V ∈ V(H),
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there exists a state space picture similar to the classical case: each V is an abelian
C∗-algebra, so by Gel’fand duality there is an isomorphism G : V → C(ΣV ) of C∗-
algebras between V and the continuous, complex-valued functions on the Gel’fand
spectrum ΣV of V . Here, the Gel’fand spectrum ΣV , which is a compact Hausdorﬀ
space, takes the roˆle of the state space for the physical quantities described by self-
adjoint operators in V . Each self-adjoint operator Aˆ ∈ V is sent to the real-valued
function G(Aˆ) on ΣV , given by
∀λ ∈ ΣV : G(Aˆ)(λ) = λ(Aˆ.) (3)
It holds that im(G(Aˆ)) = sp(Aˆ). Since V is a von Neumann algebra, the Gel’fand
spectrum ΣV is extremely disconnected.
The main idea is to deﬁne a presheaf Σ over the context category V(H) from all
the local state spaces ΣV , V ∈ V(H), by assigning to each context V ∈ V(H) its
Gel’fand spectrum ΣV = ΣV . If V
′ ⊂ V , then there is a canonical function
Σ(iV ′V ) : ΣV −→ΣV ′ (4)
λ −→ λ|V ′ .
This deﬁnes the spectral presheaf Σ, which is the analogue of the state space S of
a classical system. It is a generalised set in the sense discussed in section 2.2.
Each context V ∈ V(H) is determined by its lattice of projections P(V ) (since a
von Neumann algebra is generated by its projections). The projections Qˆ ∈ P(V )
represent propositions “AεΔ” that can be made from the perspective of V . Since
V is an abelian von Neumann algebra, the projection lattice P(V ) is a distributive
lattice. Moreover, P(V ) is complete and orthocomplemented. There is a lattice
isomorphism between P(V ) and Cl(ΣV ), the lattice of clopen, i.e., closed and open
subsets of the Gel’fand spectrum ΣV of V :
α : P(V )−→Cl(ΣV ) (5)
Pˆ −→SPˆ := {λ ∈ ΣV | λ(Pˆ ) = 1}.
Locally, at each V ∈ V(H), this gives the correspondence between projections in V
and subsets of the Gel’fand spectrum ΣV .
3 Representation of Propositions
3.1 Daseinisation of Projections
Let S be a given quantum system, and let “AεΔ” be a proposition about the
value of some physical quantity A of the system. The task is to ﬁnd a suitable
representative of the proposition within the topos scheme.
The main idea is very simple: the spectral presheaf Σ is an analogue of the state
space of a classical system. Since, in classical physics, propositions correspond to
Borel subsets of the state space, we construct suitable subsets, or rather, subobjects,
of the spectral presheaf that will serve as representatives of propositions.
There is a straightforward way of doing this: let “AεΔ” be a proposition, and
let Pˆ = Eˆ[AεΔ] be the corresponding projection in P(H). In a ﬁrst step, we
‘adapt’ the projection Pˆ to all contexts by deﬁning
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∀V ∈ V(H) : δo(Pˆ )V :=
∧
{Qˆ ∈ P(V ) | Qˆ ≥ Pˆ}. (6)
That is, we approximate Pˆ from above by the smallest projection in V that is larger
than or equal to Pˆ . On the level of local propositions 6 , we pick the strongest local
proposition implied by “AεΔ” that is available from the perspective of V . In simple
cases, δo(Pˆ )V represents a local proposition “AεΓ”, where Γ ⊇ Δ. In general, the
self-adjoint operator Aˆ representing a physical quantity A need not be contained in
V and thus the proposition represented by δo(Pˆ )V is of the form “B ∈ Γ”, where
B is a physical quantity such that the corresponding self-adjoint operator Bˆ is in
V . 7 In any case, δo(Pˆ )V ≥ Pˆ .
The central conceptual idea in the deﬁnition of the representative of a proposition
“AεΔ” is coarse-graining. Each context V ∈ V(H) provides a classical perspective
on the quantum system, characterised by the collection P(V ) of projection operators
in V . The projections in V correspond to local propositions about the values of
physical quantities in V . If the global proposition “AεΔ” that we start from is a
proposition about some physical quantity A that is is represented by a self-adjoint
operator Aˆ in V , then the projection Pˆ representing “AεΔ” is also contained in V ,
and daseinisation will pick this projection at Pˆ (i.e., δo(Pˆ )V = Pˆ ). If Aˆ /∈ V and
Pˆ /∈ V , we have to adapt Pˆ to the context V . It is natural to pick the strongest
local proposition implied by “AεΔ” that can be made from the perspective of V .
On the level of projections, this means that one has to take the smallest projection
in V larger than Pˆ . In this case, δo(Pˆ )V > Pˆ .
From Pˆ , we thus obtain a collection of projections, one for each context V ∈
V(H). We then use, for each V ∈ V(H), the isomorphism (5) to obtain a family
(Sδo(Pˆ )V )V ∈V(H) of clopen subsets. It is straightforward to show that for all V
′, V ∈
V(H) such that V ′ ⊂ V , it holds that
Sδo(Pˆ )V |V ′ = {λ|V ′ | λ ∈ Sδo(Pˆ )V } ⊆ Sδo(Pˆ )V ′ (7)
(see Thm. 3.1 in [15]. Actually, there it is shown that equality holds, which is
more than we need here.) This means that the family (Sδo(Pˆ )V )V ∈V(H) forms a
subobject—which is nothing but a subpresheaf—of the spectral presheaf Σ. This
subobject will be denoted as δ(Pˆ ) and is called the daseinisation of Pˆ .
While we deﬁned the subobject δ(Pˆ ) of Σ stagewise, i.e., for each V ∈ V(H),
the subobject itself is a global object, consisting of all the subsets
δ(Pˆ )
V
= Sδo(Pˆ )V (8)
for V ∈ V(H), and the functions
δ(Pˆ )
V
−→ δ(Pˆ )
V ′
, λ −→ λ|V ′ (9)
between them (for all V ′ ⊆ V ). In other words, δ(Pˆ ) is a presheaf over the context
category V(H) and not a mere set. The whole of δ(Pˆ ) represents the proposition
6 We call those propositions local (at V ) that are represented by projection operators in V via the spectral
theorem. The proposition “AεΔ” that we want to represent is global. For each context V ∈ V(H), the
global proposition becomes coarse-grained to give some local proposition.
7 We remark that even if Aˆ /∈ V , we can still have Pˆ = Eˆ[AεΔ] ∈ V .
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“AεΔ” (where Pˆ is the projection corresponding to the proposition “AεΔ”). Many
mathematical arguments concerning subobjects can be made stage by stage, yet the
global character of subobjects is important both mathematically and in the physical
interpretation.
A subobject S of Σ such that the components SV are clopen sets for all V is
called a clopen subobject. One can show that the clopen subobjects form a complete
Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ) (see Thm. 2.5 in [15]). The subobjects obtained from
daseinisation are all clopen. Compared to all subobjects of Σ, the use of clopen
ones has some technical advantages. We regard the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ) of
clopen subobjects of the spectral presheaf as the algebra representing (propositional)
quantum logic in the topos formulation. Subcl(Σ) is the analogue of the Boolean
σ-algebra of Borel subsets of the state space S of a classical system.
In the following, we discuss the main properties of daseinisation and of topos
quantum logic in general.
3.2 Properties of daseinisation and their physical interpretation
The following mapping is called daseinisation of projections :
δ : P(H)−→ Subcl(Σ) (10)
Pˆ −→ δ(Pˆ ).
It is straightforward to show that daseinisation has the following properties:
(1) If Pˆ < Qˆ, then δ(Pˆ ) < δ(Qˆ), i.e., daseinisation is order-preserving;
(2) the mapping δ : P(H) → Subcl(Σ) is injective, that is, two inequivalent propo-
sitions 8 correspond to two diﬀerent subobjects;
(3) δ(0ˆ) = 0, the empty subobject, and δ(1ˆ) = Σ. The trivially false proposi-
tion is represented by the empty subobject, the trivially true proposition is
represented by the whole of Σ.
Moreover, we will show that
(4) for all Pˆ , Qˆ ∈ P(H), it holds that δ(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ) = δ(Pˆ )∨δ(Qˆ), that is, daseinisation
preserves the disjunction (Or) of propositions;
(5) for all Pˆ , Qˆ ∈ P(H), it holds that δ(Pˆ ∧ Qˆ) ≤ δ(Pˆ )∧δ(Qˆ), that is, daseinisation
does not preserve the conjunction (And) of propositions;
(6) in general, δ(Pˆ )∧ δ(Qˆ) is not of the form δ(Rˆ) for a projection Rˆ ∈ P(H), and
daseinisation is not surjective.
Daseinisation can be seen as a ‘translation’ mapping between ordinary, Birkhoﬀ-
von Neumann quantum logic [5], which is based upon the non-distributive lattice
of projections P(H) in B(H), and the topos form of propositional quantum logic,
which is based upon the distributive lattice Subcl(Σ). The latter more precisely is
a Heyting algebra.
8 It is well-known that the mapping from propositions to projections is many-to-one. Two propositions are
equivalent if they correspond to the same projection.
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The properties (1–3) clearly are physically sensible. Before discussing properties
(4–6) in some more detail, we emphasise that this representation of propositions by
subobjects of the spectral presheaf, an object in the topos SetV(H)
op
, has a strong
geometric aspect. The spectral presheaf is the object that naturally incorporates
the state spaces of all abelian subalgebras V ∈ V(H) of the algebra B(H) of physical
quantities of the quantum system. Moreover, the local state spaces ΣV are related
by the canonical restriction functions Σ(iV ′V ) : ΣV → ΣV ′ , λ → λ|V ′ , for all
V ′, V ∈ V(H) such that V ′ ⊂ V .
The spectral presheaf can be seen as a topological space in the topos SetV(H)
op
,
and it is closely related to the internal Gel’fand spectrum of an abelian C∗-algebra
B(H) in the functor topos SetV(H) that can be deﬁned canonically from B(H) as
suggested in [21]. Details about the relation between the spectral presheaf Σ and
the spectrum of B(H) can be found in [12]. This strong geometrical and topological
character of our quantum state space Σ is very diﬀerent from the usual interpretation
of Hilbert space as a state space, with closed subspaces resp. the projections onto
these as representatives of propositions. In particular, neither the spectral presheaf
Σ nor its components ΣV , V ∈ V(H), are linear spaces.
In order to prove property (4), we ﬁrst observe that for every V ∈ V(H), the
mapping
δoV : P(H)−→P(V ) (11)
Pˆ −→
∧
{Qˆ ∈ P(V ) | Qˆ ≥ Pˆ}
is order-preserving. Let Pˆ , Qˆ ∈ P(H), then δo(Pˆ )V ≤ δo(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ)V and δo(Qˆ)V ≤
δo(Pˆ∨Qˆ)V , so δo(Pˆ )V ∨δo(Qˆ)V ≤ δo(Pˆ∨Qˆ)V . Conversely, δo(Pˆ )V ∨δo(Qˆ)V ≥ Pˆ and
δo(Pˆ )V ∨ δo(Qˆ)V ≥ Qˆ, so δo(Pˆ )V ∨ δo(Qˆ)V ≥ Pˆ ∨ Qˆ. But since δo(Pˆ )V ∨ δo(Qˆ)V ∈
P(V ) and δo(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ)V is the smallest projection in V larger than or equal to Pˆ ∨ Qˆ,
we also have δo(Pˆ )V ∨ δo(Qˆ)V ≥ δo(Pˆ ∨ Qˆ)V . Since the join of subobjects is deﬁned
stagewise, property (4) follows.
It is easy to see that property (4), the preservation of joins, can actually be
generalised to arbitrary joins,
δ(
∨
i∈I
Pˆi) =
∨
i∈I
δ(Pˆi). (12)
The join of projections relates to superposition in standard quantum logic. The
following argument is from standard quantum logic: let “AεΔ” and “BεΓ” be two
propositions, represented by projections Pˆ resp. Qˆ. Any unit vector ψ in the closed
subspace PˆH of Hilbert space represents a pure state in which the proposition
“AεΔ” is true (i.e., the expectation value of Pˆ in such a state is 1). Similarly,
every unit vector in QˆH is a state such that “BεΓ” is true.
Superposition without linearity.
The join Pˆ ∨ Qˆ of the two projections is the projection onto the closure of the
linear subspace spanned by PˆH and QˆH. In general, there are unit vectors, i.e., pure
states ψ in the closed subspace (Pˆ ∨ Qˆ)H that are neither in PˆH nor in QˆH. Such a
state ψ makes the proposition “‘AεΔ or BεΓ”, represented by Pˆ ∨ Qˆ, true, despite
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the fact that in the state ψ, neither “AεΔ” nor “BεΓ” are true. A state ψ of this
kind can be written as a linear combination of vectors in PˆH and QˆH and is called a
superposition state. The fact that states can be superposed by linear combinations
is a fundamental fact of quantum theory. Clearly, superposition relates directly to
the fact that Hilbert space is a linear space.
In this argument, one uses a certain feature of standard quantum logic that
has been regarded as problematic: the fact that closed subspaces or projections
represent physical properties in an intensional sense and, at the same time, are the
extensions thereof, namely the collection of states which make the proposition true.
This extensional collapse has been called the “metaphysical disaster” of standard
quantum logic by Foulis and Randall [33], see also the discussion in [8], where the
problem is stated as:
“The standard structures seem to determine a kind of extensional collapse. In
fact, the closed subspaces of a Hilbert space represent at the same time physical
properties in an intensional sense and the extensions thereof (sets of states that
certainly verify the properties in question). As happens in classical set theoretical
semantics, there is no mathematical representative for physical properties in an
intensional sense. Foulis and Randall have called such an extensional collapse
“the metaphysical disaster” of the standard quantum logical approach.”
In our topos approach, we did not invoke states yet, nor is our quantum state ob-
ject Σ a linear space. Yet, we have the remarkable fact that daseinisation ‘translates’
the disjunction of projections into the disjunction of clopen subobjects, i.e., dasein-
isation is a join-semilattice morphism. Interestingly, the binary join in Subcl(Σ) is
deﬁned componentwise by set-theoretic union: let S1, S2 be two clopen subobjects,
then
∀V ∈ V(H) : (S1 ∨ S2)V = S1;V ∪ S2;V . (13)
Diﬀerently from the Hilbert space situation, the linear span of linear subspaces
does not play any role. The behaviour of projections under joins, which in standard
quantum theory is so closely linked to superposition and the linear character of
Hilbert space, is mapped by daseinisation to a lattice where joins are given by set-
theoretic unions (in each component). Despite the fact that the spectral presheaf is
not a linear space, daseinisation thus preserves a central aspect of standard quantum
logic, namely that part which relates to superposition.
We further remark that we avoid the metaphysical disaster criticised by Foulis
and Randall. Clopen subobjects represent propositions, but they are not collections
of states that make the propositions true.
Conjunction and coarse-graining.
Property (5) shows that conjunction of projections is not preserved. It is
straightforward to construct a counterexample: let Pˆ ∈ P(H) be a projection,
and let V ∈ V(H) be a context that does not contain Pˆ . Then δo(Pˆ )V > Pˆ and
δo(1ˆ− Pˆ )V > 1ˆ− Pˆ , so δo(Pˆ )V ∧ δo(1ˆ− Pˆ )V > 0ˆ, while of course Pˆ ∧ (1ˆ− Pˆ ) = 0ˆ.
Since the meet of subobjects is deﬁned stagewise, property (5) follows. This clearly
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also implies property (6).
The counterexample shows that preservation of conjunction does not fail just
because of non-commutativity of the projections, which usually is interpreted as ex-
pressing incompatibility of the propositions represented by the projections. Rather,
in the counterexample preservation of conjunction is not given due to coarse-graining.
Dalla Chiara and Giuntini [8] sum up another common criticism of the standard
quantum logic formalism:
“The lattice structure of the closed subspaces automatically renders the quantum
proposition system closed under logical conjunction. This seems to imply some
counterintuitive consequences from the physical point of view. Suppose two exper-
imental propositions that concern two strongly incompatible quantities, like “the
spin in the x direction is up”, “the spin in the y direction is down”. In such a
situation, the intuition of the quantum physicist seems to suggest the following se-
mantic requirement: the conjunction of our propositions has no deﬁnite meaning;
for, they cannot be experimentally tested at the same time. As a consequence, the
lattice proposition structure seems to be too strong.”
In the topos approach, as in standard quantum logic, the conjunction of any
two propositions is deﬁned, but there is an interesting conceptual twist: the built-
in contextuality and coarse-graining take care of the fact that there are strongly
incompatible propositions as the ones mentioned above. Let Pˆ be the projection
representing the proposition “the spin in the x direction is up” (which clearly is
of the form “AεΔ”), and let Qˆ represent “the spin in the y direction is down”.
Then Pˆ and Qˆ do not commute, so they are not both contained in any context
V ∈ V(H). If we consider a context V such that Pˆ ∈ V , then Qˆ /∈ V and hence
δo(Qˆ)V > Qˆ. From a perspective of such a context V , the proposition “the spin in
the y direction is down” becomes coarse-grained, potentially to become the trivially
true proposition represented by the identity operator 1ˆ. Similarly, if a context V
contains Qˆ, then δo(Pˆ )V > Pˆ , and hence the proposition “the spin in the x direction
is up” becomes coarse-grained from the perspective of such a context. There is no
single context that allows to express the conjunction between the incompatible
propositions within the context. But, since the (clopen) subobjects representing
propositions are global objects, it still makes sense to talk about the conjunction of
incompatible propositions in the topos scheme.
When discussing states and how they assign truth-values to propositions, we
will see that there are non-trivial propositions that are not totally true in any state.
This is possible because the topos approach provides us with the collection of all
clopen subobjects of the spectral presheaf as representatives of propositions. Among
them are many that are not of the form δ(Pˆ ) for a projection Pˆ . In contrast to
that, in standard quantum logic every non-trivial proposition corresponds to a non-
trivial closed subspace of Hilbert space, so there always are states that make the
proposition true.
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Material implication.
Each Heyting algebra H has an implication, given by
∀x, y ∈ H : (x ⇒ y) =
∨
{z ∈ H | z ∧ x ≤ y}. (14)
Applied to our Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ), whose elements represent propositions
about the quantum system under consideration, this becomes
∀S1, S2 ∈ Subcl(Σ) : (S1 ⇒ S2) =
∨
{S ∈ Subcl(Σ) | S ∧ S1 ≤ S2}. (15)
Using the well-known form for Heyting implication in presheaf topoi (see e.g. [31],
p56), this can be evaluated concretely for all V ∈ V(H) as
(S1 ⇒ S2)V = {λ ∈ ΣV | ∀V ′ ⊆ V : if λ|V ′ ∈ S1;V ′ then λ|V ′ ∈ S2;V ′}. (16)
Note that this expression is not local at V , since a local deﬁnition would fail to give
a subobject.
Hence, topos quantum logic comes with a material implication. This is another
improvement compared to standard quantum logic, which is suﬀering from the lack
of a proper implication. In particular, the Sasaki hook does not provide a material
implication, as is well known.
Negation in topos quantum logic.
The negation is given in terms of the Heyting implication as usual:
¬S := (S ⇒ 0), (17)
where 0 is the minimal element in the Heyting algebra Subcl(Σ), namely the empty
subobject.
This can be evaluated concretely for all V ∈ V(H) as
¬SV := {λ ∈ ΣV | ∀V ′ ⊆ V : λ|V ′ /∈ SV ′}. (18)
4 Pure states and truth-value assignments
4.1 Truth objects and pseudo-states
Let ψ ∈ H be a unit vector. As usual, ψ is identiﬁed with the vector state it
determines:
wψ : B(H)−→C (19)
Aˆ −→wψ(Aˆ) = 〈ψ| Aˆ |ψ〉.
The vector state ψ is a pure state on B(H), i.e., an extreme point of the space of
states (positive linear functionals of norm 1) on B(H). In the topos approach, one
cannot simply pick a (global) element of the spectral presheaf Σ as the representative
of a state, since Σ has no global elements at all. As Butterﬁeld and Isham observed,
this is exactly equivalent to the Kochen-Specker theorem [23,24,25,26].
Instead, one deﬁnes a presheaf Tψ over V(H) that collects all those propositions
that are totally true in the state ψ. For each V ∈ V(H), let
T
ψ
V = {SPˆ ∈ Cl(ΣV ) | Pˆ ≥ Pˆψ}. (20)
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Here, SPˆ = α(Pˆ ) is the clopen subset of ΣV corresponding to Pˆ as deﬁned in
(5), and Pˆψ is the projection onto the one-dimensional subspace of Hilbert space
determined by ψ. The component TψV hence contains all those clopen subsets of ΣV
that (a) represent local propositions that can be made from the perspective of V
and (b) are true in the state ψ.
If V ′ ⊂ V , then there is a function
T
ψ(iV ′V ) : T
ψ
V −→TψV ′ (21)
SPˆ −→Sδo(Pˆ )V ′ . (22)
In this way, Tψ becomes a presheaf. It is called the truth object associated to ψ.
A global element S of Tψ consists of one clopen subset SV ∈ Cl(ΣV ) for each
V ∈ V(H) such that SV |V ′ = SV ′ . Such a global element S clearly is a clopen
subobject of Σ. The physical interpretation is that those subobjects S that are
global elements of Tψ (and those which are larger than a global element of Tψ)
represent propositions that are totally true in the state ψ. The collection ΓTψ of
global elements of the truth object forms a partially ordered set. It is easy to see
that this poset is contained in the ﬁlter
ΓTψ = {S ∈ Subcl(Σ) | S ≥ δ(Pˆψ)}. (23)
The clopen subobject δ(Pˆψ) hence plays a special roˆle, it is the smallest subobject
representing a totally true proposition. If a classical system is in a pure state s ∈ S,
then the smallest subset representing a proposition that is true in the state s is {s}.
Hence, the subobject δ(Pˆψ) is the analogue of a one-element subset {s} of the state
space S of a classical system.
wψ := δ(Pˆψ) (24)
is called the pseudo-state associated to ψ.
4.2 Truth-value assignments
As mentioned before, in classical physics the assignment of truth-values to proposi-
tions is straightforward. Given a state s ∈ S of the system, a proposition “AεΔ”
is true if s is contained in the Borel subset S of the state space S that represents
the proposition, and false otherwise.
In the topos scheme, we have a completely analogous situation: let S be the
clopen subobject of the spectral presheaf representing a proposition constructed by
conjunction, disjunction and/or negation of elementary propositions “AεΔ”, and
let wψ be the pseudo-state associated to some given state ψ. It is straightforward
to prove that for each V ∈ V(H),
v(wψ ⊆ S)V = {V ′ ⊆ V | wψV ′ ⊆ SV ′} (25)
is a sieve on V . Moreover, if V ′ ⊂ V , then
v(wψ ⊆ S)V ′ = v(wψ ⊆ S)V ∩ ↓V ′, (26)
so v(wψ ⊆ S) = (v(wψ ⊆ S)V )V ∈V(H) is a global element of the subobject classiﬁer
Ω of SetV(H)
op
, i.e., a topos-internal truth-value for the proposition “AεΔ” in the
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state ψ. For more details, see [18]. The truth-value v(wψ ⊆ S) can be interpreted
as the answer of the question ‘to which degree does the pseudo-state wψ lie in the
subobject S?’. Diﬀerent from the classical case, where a point s either lies in a
subset or not (which determines a Boolean truth-value in the topos Set), we have
a truth-value in the logic given by our topos SetV(H)
op
.
The simplest description of the truth-value v(wψ ⊆ S) is a more global one:
v(wψ ⊆ S) is the collection of all V ∈ V(H) such that the component wψV of the
pseudo-state is contained in the component SV of the subobject representing a
proposition. By construction, if V is contained in this collection, then all V ′ ⊂ V
are also contained in it. A context V is contained in the collection if and only if
the local proposition at V is true in the state ψ, which is the case if and only if the
expectation value of the projection PˆSV = α
−1(SV ) in the state ψ is 1.
It also becomes clear that the smallest subobjects that can represent totally true
propositions are those of the form wψ = δ(Pˆψ). There are smaller non-trivial sub-
objects S, for example those given by a conjunction δ(Pˆψ1)∧δ(Pˆψ2). The subobject
that represents the proposition “spin in x direction is up and spin in y direction is
down” is of this form. There is no state ψ that makes this proposition totally true.
In this sense, the topos form of quantum logic takes care of the conjunction of non-
compatible propositions in a non-trivial way, diﬀerent from Birkhoﬀ-von Neumann
quantum logic. We conjecture that this feature will lead to a logical formulation of
the uncertainty relations.
Each pure state ψ determines a truth-value assignment
vψ : Subcl(Σ)−→ΓΩ (27)
S −→ v(wψ ⊆ S).
Since both the clopen subobjects Subcl(Σ) of the spectral presheaf and the truth-
values ΓΩ form a Heyting algebra, one might wonder if vψ is a homomorphism of
Heyting algebras. Let S1, S2 be two clopen subobjects. Then, for all V ∈ V(H),
vψ(S1 ∧ S2)V = {V ′ ⊆ V | Pˆ(S1∧S2)V ≥ Pˆψ}
= {V ′ ⊆ V | PˆS1;V ∧ PˆS2;V ≥ Pˆψ}
= {V ′ ⊆ V | PˆS1;V ≥ Pˆψ} ∩ {V ′ ⊆ V | PˆS2;V ≥ Pˆψ}
= vψ(S1)V ∧ vψ(S2)V ,
so we obtain
∀S1, S2 ∈ Subcl(Σ) : vψ(S1 ∧ S2) = vψ(S1) ∧ vψ(S2). (28)
Truth-value assignments thus preserve conjunction. On the other hand, for all
V ∈ V(H),
vψ(S1 ∨ S2)V = {V ′ ⊆ V | Pˆ(S1∨S2)V ≥ Pˆψ}
= {V ′ ⊆ V | PˆS1;V ∨ PˆS2;V ≥ Pˆψ}
⊇ {V ′ ⊆ V | PˆS1;V ≥ Pˆψ} ∪ {V ′ ⊆ V | PˆS2;V ≥ Pˆψ}
= vψ(S1)V ∨ vψ(S2)V ,
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so
∀S1, S2 ∈ Subcl(Σ) : vψ(S1 ∨ S2) ≥ vψ(S1) ∨ vψ(S2). (29)
A truth-value assignment vψ need not preserve disjunction. In general, the truth-
value of a disjunction of two propositions is larger than the disjunction of the truth-
values of the propositions. Clearly, this relates to superposition. While we have used
a formulation of the truth-value assignment employing projections, one could as well
formulate everything just using clopen subsets of Gel’fand spectra. This shows that
the topos form of quantum logic preserves that part of standard quantum logic that
relates to superposition, but without the need for linear structures.
5 Mixed states
In this short section, we will sketch how mixed states can be treated in the topos
approach and how they relate to the logical aspects.
5.1 States as measures on the spectral presheaf
Let ρ be an arbitrary state of the quantum system under consideration. ρ is a
positive linear functional on B(H) of norm 1. This is very diﬀerent from the classical
case, where an arbitrary state is a probability measure μ on the state space S of the
system.
Interestingly, the topos approach allows the representation of arbitrary states
ρ of a quantum system by probability measures on the spectral presheaf, as was
shown in [11]. We refer to this article for the proofs of the results in this section.
The measure μρ associated to ρ is the mapping
μρ : Subcl(Σ)−→Γ[0, 1] (30)
S = (SV )V ∈V(H) −→ μρ(S) = (ρ(PˆSV ))V ∈V(H).
The codomain Γ[0, 1] denotes antitone functions from V(H) to the unit interval
[0, 1], i.e., if g ∈ Γ[0, 1] and V ′ ⊂ V , then 1 ≥ g(V ′) ≥ g(V ) ≥ 0. (These functions
can be understood as the global elements of a certain presheaf, hence the notation.)
To each clopen subobject, such a function is assigned by the measure μρ. It is
straightforward to see that μρ(Σ) = 1V(H), the function that is constantly 1.
The abstract deﬁnition of a measure is as follows: a mapping
μ : Subcl(Σ)−→Γ[0, 1] (31)
S = (SV )V ∈V(H) −→ μ(S) = (μ(SV ))V ∈V(H) (32)
is called a measure on the clopen subobjects of Σ if the following two conditions are
fulﬁlled:
• μ(Σ) = 1V(H);
• for all S1, S2 ∈ Subcl(Σ), it holds that μ(S1 ∨ S2) + μ(S1 ∧ S2) = μ(S1) + μ(S2).
Somewhat surprisingly, these very weak conditions—which do not refer to non-
commutativity or linearity in any direct sense—suﬃce to determine a unique state
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ρμ on B(H) provided dim(H) ≥ 3, and every state arises that way. Measures on the
spectral presheaf hence completely encode positive linear functionals on the algebra
B(H) of physical quantities.
5.2 The relation between measures and logical aspects
Let ρ = ψ be a pure state, and let μψ be the corresponding measure. Clearly, if for
some S ∈ Subcl(Σ) we have μψ(S) = 1V(H), i.e., the clopen subobject S is of measure
1V(H), then S represents a proposition that is totally true in the state described by
μψ. The smallest subobject of measure 1V(H) with respect to the measure μψ, that
is, the support of the measure μψ, is the pseudo-state w
ψ.
More generally, the truth-value of the proposition represented by S in the state
represented by μψ is the collection of all those V ∈ V(H) such that μψ(S)(V ) = 1,
since
vψ(S) = {V ∈ V(H) | μψ(S)(V ) = 1}
= {V ∈ V(H) | 〈ψ| PˆSV |ψ〉 = 1}
= {V ∈ V(H) | PˆSV ≥ Pˆψ},
where PˆSV = α
−1(SV ). The measure μψ corresponding to a pure state ψ hence
encodes the logical aspects given by the truth-value assignment vψ determined by
ψ.
For mixed states, there is no such simple connection between the measure-
theoretical and the logical aspects. The pseudo-state wψ corresponding to a pure
state ψ determines a unique measure μψ that has w
ψ as its support. In contrast to
that, a mixed state ρ is not determined uniquely by its support. One may, however,
describe an arbitrary mixed state ρ uniquely in terms of a family of generalised
truth objects.
Instead of considering a single truth object Tρ, we deﬁne a family (Tρr)r∈(0,1] by
∀V ∈ V(H)∀r ∈ (0, 1] : Tρr;V := {S ∈ Cl(ΣV ) | ρ(PˆS) ≥ r} (33)
= {S ∈ Cl(ΣV ) | μρ(S) ≥ r}. (34)
This is a direct generalisation of the deﬁnition of a truth object (equation (20)),
since
T
ψ
V = {SPˆ ∈ Cl(ΣV ) | Pˆ ≥ Pˆψ}
= {S ∈ Cl(ΣV ) | PˆS ≥ Pˆψ}
= {S ∈ Cl(ΣV ) | 〈ψ| PˆS |ψ〉 = 1}
= {S ∈ Cl(ΣV ) | 〈ψ| PˆS |ψ〉 ≥ 1}
so the truth object Tψ is equal to the element Tψ1 of the family (T
ψ
r )r∈(0,1].
It is easy to see that each Tρr , r ∈ (0, 1], is a presheaf over V(H). The global
elements of Tρr are clopen subobjects that are of measure rV(H) or greater with
respect to the measure μρ. Here, rV(H) is the function that is constantly r on V(H).
We saw that every measure μρ determines a unique family (T
ρ
r)r∈(0,1] of gen-
eralised truth objects. Conversely, the measure μρ can be reconstructed from the
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family (Tρr)r∈(0,1]. This and many further aspects will be treated in detail in [19].
6 Related work
Recently, Landsman et al. proposed to another scheme of topos quantum logic that
is closely related to ours [21,6]. The main diﬀerence lies in the fact that Landsman
et al. are using the topos SetV(H) of covariant functors over the context category.
In fact, in [21], they consider an arbitrary C∗-algebra, not just B(H). Yet, in [6],
where some deﬁnitions from [21] are made explicit, the special case of the algebra
Mn(C) is used, which of course equals B(H) for an n-dimensional Hilbert space.
The main advantage of using covariant functors is that the external algebra B(H)
determines a canonical internal algebra B(H) which is an abelian C∗-algebra in the
topos SetV(H). By constructive Gel’fand duality, as developed by Banaschewski and
Mulvey [1,2,3,4], this internal algebra has a Gel’fand spectrum Σ, which is a locale
in the topos SetV(H). (A locale is a generalised topological space, see e.g. [27].)
Landsman et al. suggest to use the opens in this locale as the representatives of
propositions. For a detailed comparison between the contravariant and the covariant
approach, see [12].
The use of a form of intuitionistic logic for quantum theory has also been sug-
gested by Coecke in [7]. He uses a construction discovered by Bruns and Lakser,
the so-called injective hull of meet-semilattices (see also [34]) to embed a meet-
semilattice of propositions into a Heyting algebra by introducing new joins to the
meet-semilattice. There are no further obvious connections between this approach
and the topos form of quantum logic, but it would be interesting to compare both
constructions with respect to the underlying geometric structures: both approaches
formulate an intuitionistic form of quantum logic using Heyting algebras, and every
complete Heyting algebra is a locale and hence a generalised topological space.
7 Conclusion
We presented the main features of the topos form of quantum logic. This new form of
quantum logic is distributive, intuitionistic, multi-valued and contextual. Moreover,
it has a clear underlying geometric structure. The spectral presheaf serves as an
analogue of the state space of a classical system, with propositions being represented
as subobjects. Interestingly, topos quantum logic preserves that part of standard
quantum logic that relates to superposition. The truth-value assignments given
by pure states do not depend on any notion of measurement and observers, i.e.,
there is no need for an instrumentalist interpretation. Mixed states can be fully
described as measures on the spectral presheaf. There are interesting relations
between the measure-theoretical and the logical aspects of the theory that will be
further investigated in future work.
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